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Abstract Much recent work in neuroscience aims to shed light on whether we have
free will. Can it? Can any science? To answer, we need to disentangle different
notions of free will, and clarify what we mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘testable’. That
done, my main conclusion is, duly interpreted: that free will is not a testable hy-
pothesis. In particular, it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by empirical evidence.
The arguments for this are not a priori but rather are based on a posteriori con-
sideration of the relevant neuroscientific investigations, as well as on standard
philosophy of science work on the notion of testability.
1 Introduction
Do we have free will? Label by Testable the view that this can be tested empirically,
where by ‘empirically’ I mean third-person investigations such as those of
neuroscience and cognitive psychology. Testable is endorsed by many neurosci-
entists1 and, as we will see, also by many philosophers, at least implicitly.
Nevertheless, I will argue, free will is not an empirically testable hypothesis and
thus Testable is false.
I will depart from much of the existing literature in two ways. First, I focus
exclusively on the metaphysical existence question. Thus, I say nothing about moral
responsibility or about free will’s relation to normative theorizing more generally.
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Second, my arguments are not a priori. Rather, they are based on a posteriori
consideration of relevant empirical investigations. I do not have in mind
hypothetical discoveries that might somehow tell us whether the universe as a
whole is deterministic, but instead the actual neuroscientific research programs
underway now into human decision-making. What is at stake is whether
disagreement about the existence of free will can ever be resolved empirically.
The originality of the argument here will lie in making the case for untestability
without, so to speak, fixing the philosophical deck in advance, for instance by a
priori dismissing incompatibilist free will as unintelligible, or as unacceptable be-
cause it contradicts methodological naturalism.
To start with, I will understand free will along classic incompatibilist lines,
namely as, roughly speaking, human agents having some capacity to influence the
world independent of prior physical causes. Free agents are taken to be in control of
what they do (including deciding) in a way that distinguishes their free behavior
from random behavior. I will consider various refinements as we go along,
concentrating on those that are most favorable for Testable and showing that even
then Testable fails.2 Then I will turn to the (much easier) case of compatibilism.
The word ‘testable’ is ambiguous: do we mean testable now or testable also in the
future? I will argue that free will is not testable now (and so has not yet been verified
or falsified) and will not be testable in the near future. With respect to the distant
future I will conclude, with respect to human investigators and given the entrenched
background assumptions on either side, that whether free will will ever be testable is
an open question but that there is no particular reason to expect that it will be.
It will help to consider the two faces of empirical testing separately: first
verification and then falsification. After that, I will examine the very notion of
testability more closely.
2 Is Free Will Verifiable?
What feasible empirical findings would establish to a believer in Testable that free
will exists? My answer is: ‘none’, or at least none that are feasible now or in the near
future, and arguably even in the distant future.
To see why not, begin by clarifying exactly what a confirming piece of evidence
would be. Initially, one might think of something along the lines of a physical action
that an agent reported having willed and yet that had no detectable prior physical
causes. Now, presumably there would be some proximate physical causes even in
this case. For instance, the raising of a hand would be preceded by nerve impulses
travelling to the muscles in the arm—if not, then the raising of the hand would be a
miracle quite independent of free will. So when speaking of ‘prior physical causes’
here, we have in mind neurological events in the brain. But this still needs to be
2 Two cases of this already: first, several writers argue that free will should be seen as something that
comes in degrees (e.g. O’Connor 2009). But I will focus on the simpler issue of whether there exists free
will to any degree at all, arguing that even that is untestable. Second, it is disputed by some that we must
require free behavior and random behavior to be distinguishable. If we do not then free will is much
harder to test (Sect. 3 below), but generally I will assume that we do.
R. Northcott
123
Author's personal copy
refined further—for if the agent was conscious at all, there would continuously be
many neurological events in their brain. A conscious, freely willed decision itself,
though, would presumably lead to, or perhaps be constituted by, a specific new set
of neurological events in the brain. This set of events would in turn physically cause
the hand to be raised. So the key evidence, finally, would be that this new set of
neurological events has no detectable prior physical causes.
Further refinement is required, for by ‘caused’ do we mean fully determined or
merely probabilistically caused? Here, the latter would be sufficient for verification.
That is, if no fully determining unconscious causes of the conscious decision-
making could be found, that would be evidence of free will. If prior neurological
events made an action more likely but did not determine it—in other words if they
were merely probabilistic causes of it—that would still leave some part of the causal
pie, so to speak, to free will.3 The prior neurological events would be akin to mere
‘influences’ or ‘dispositions’.
In summary so far, the relevant situation would be that, at the moment of
conscious decision, a set of neurological events begins the chain of physical
causation that leads to the hand being raised. The verification condition would then
be: that we cannot detect any prior physical causes that fully determine this set of
neurological events.
However, would such a situation indeed establish the existence of free will? No.
After all, in effect we are in this epistemic position already, and indeed always have
been, for there are of course many actions for which neuroscience does not yet have
a complete causal explanation. But merely finding something unexplained in itself
proves nothing—we find unexplained things all the time. What would be required
instead is finding something unexplainable, which is a much taller order. For how
could we ever establish this stronger claim, namely not only that we currently have
no complete explanation but also that we will not in the future?
The only scientific4 route to a demonstration of free will is therefore via a proof
of absence. In particular, what must be proved is the absence of fully determining
prior physical causes of the activity in the brain that corresponds to conscious
decision-making.5 It is this epistemological demand that is the fundamental
difficulty because, given our incomplete (to put it mildly) knowledge of the brain, it
is very hard to rule out the relevant causes being merely undiscovered rather than
absent.
3 This does assume that the unaccounted for portion cannot legitimately be put down to unknown causes
other than free will—an important condition. I return to this point at the end of Sect. 4 below.
4 As with ‘empirical’, by ‘scientific’ and cognate terms I mean third-person investigations.
5 In practice, in the eyes of many even a proven absence of this sort would not be deemed enough for
verification. Most scientists would undoubtedly further demand a detailed positive theory of free will,
which made novel empirical predictions, could be related to other scientific theories, and so on. Perhaps
imposing this further demand is equivalent to imposing an a priori commitment to methodological
naturalism. But my concern in this paper is that empirical verification of free will may still be impossible
even without such a commitment.
A proven absence of prior physical causes also does not rule out some non-physical cause (other than
free will). But, although this is undoubtedly a logical possibility, I do not think that either side of the free
will debate takes it seriously, in which case it is not dialectically significant. If we did take it seriously that
would only make verification still harder, so ultimately supporting this paper’s thesis.
Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis
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How have absences been established in other areas of science? Examples do
abound. For example, radioactive emissions have been established not to be caused
by anything external, and hidden variables ruled out (according to most) as a cause
of quantum entanglement. More generally, it is routine for trials and experiments to
establish that one thing does not cause another, for instance that the MMR vaccine
does not cause autism.
The exact methods used to establish these absences vary case by case. But they
do have one crucial factor in common, namely that, so to speak, they are cases of
total absence—hidden variables simply do not exist; there are no external causes at
all of radioactive emissions; and the control groups in the MMR studies are known
to have received no MMR vaccine at all. By contrast, in the free will case no one
thinks that neurological events in the brain do not occur at all. Rather, the
requirement is to establish that they do not fully determine a particular subset of
effects, namely conscious decision-making. This is a much more difficult task. It is
relatively easy to establish complete causal isolation for a system in order then to
rule out the influence of external prior causes—think of a radioactive atom in a
sealed box, or a plant in a sealed vessel. But there is no such total causal isolation in
the case of a living brain making decisions, nor is it feasible to create it. Similarly,
there is no prospect of establishing a control group with no neurological events.
As a result, in the free will case the prospects of establishing the necessary
absence are dim. It seems that only a complete causal knowledge of the brain’s
operation, such that every physical event at the neural level is fully explained,
would suffice. None of the usual short cuts for establishing absences is available.
This makes the task infeasible, at least in the near future and probably for rather
longer too. Whether the required level of knowledge will ever be feasible for human
investigators, and thus whether free will will ever be empirically verifiable, seems to
me an open question.
Nothing in the above arguments is a priori. There is no appeal, for instance, to the
claim that incompatibilist free will must rest on non-physical causation, which in
turn is necessarily undetectable by any empirical investigation committed to
methodological naturalism (footnote 5). Nor is the possibility of autonomous
conscious decision-making held to be incoherent with a physicalist worldview, or
the very notion of incompatibilist free will held to be unintelligible. Rather, the
difficulties are a posteriori and practical. Even if we do not adopt philosophical
presuppositions that, as it were, rule out the possibility of free will in advance, still
even then verification seems infeasible.
3 What Would Falsify Free Will?
Now turn to the flipside issue. What feasible empirical findings would establish to a
believer in Testable that free will does not exist? My answer is again: ‘none’.
Accordingly, free will is not empirically falsifiable. I will proceed in two stages: in
this section, I consider what evidence would be needed for falsification. Then, in the
next section, I argue that such evidence is unobtainable. Along the way, we will see
why arguing against Testable is not arguing against a straw man.
R. Northcott
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Start by noting that many have suggested that falsification is already to hand, or
at least soon may be. The famous series of experiments, starting in the early 1960s,
by the neurologist Benjamin Libet (1985) claim to demonstrate that volitional action
is initiated unconsciously. In particular, an electric readiness potential is reliably
detectable in the brain more than 500 ms before a physical action, but subjects
report the moment of consciously deciding to perform the action to be only 200 ms
before. Similar results have now been replicated many times. Is the readiness
potential a physical cause of the subsequent physical action? To assess this, we need
to know whether it increases the action’s probability, and to assess that in turn, we
need to know how often a readiness potential was not followed by the action.6 The
original Libet experiments only tracked cases where the action did occur, so cannot
answer this latter question. However, later studies, using a variety of methods, have
done so. And sure enough, it has been found that unconscious probabilistic causes
do exist. It is accordingly possible to predict with greater than chance accuracy
whether an action will occur before the subject consciously decides whether to
perform it. In one study, such physical causes were detected a full 4 s before
participants were aware of making a choice (Soon et al. 2013); in another, up to 10 s
(Soon et al. 2008).7
Do these results falsify free will already? No—because the causation they
establish is only probabilistic. Label by neuroprediction the prediction of an action
on the basis of the physical causes detected in a subject’s brain before their
conscious decision. The accuracy of these neuropredictions has been much less than
perfect. In both the Soon studies, for instance, they were correct only roughly 60%
of the time—barely better than the 50% accuracy achievable by pure chance. The
highest accuracy reported in any study is 80% (Fried et al. 2011). There is plenty of
room for a subsequent conscious decision to ‘change’ matters after the neuropre-
diction is made. Indeed, many participants in the Libet studies reported doing
exactly this. Accordingly, there is still room to claim a role for free will.
Several writers have argued convincingly for a similarly negative verdict (e.g.
Mele 2009, 2013; Nahmias 2014; O’Connor 2009; Mylopoulos and Lau 2014; Maoz
et al. 2014). They offer many additional reasons. One of these is that so far all of the
neurological studies have concerned simple, trivial actions such as raising a finger
or flexing a wrist. But much, perhaps most, of our interest in free will concerns its
role in drawn-out and serious matters such as deciding whether to accept a new job
or buy a new house. (Kane 2008, for example, holds that ‘self-forming actions’—in
his view the most fundamental exercises of free will—occur only in a subset of such
drawn-out cases). No current neuroprediction experiment speaks to them.
There are several other objections besides, both conceptual and methodological.
First, many philosophers dispute whether the operation of free will should always be
6 Even then, to establish causation we would need to rule out the readiness potential and subsequent
physical action being merely two independent effects of a common cause. But for our purposes we may
ignore that possibility, since it would still imply the action having been caused by some prior unconscious
event.
7 That said, this interpretation of the neurological evidence is not unanimous. Recently, Schurger et al
(2016) have argued that the build-up in the readiness potential is more akin to background noise than to
any signal or ‘decision’ to act. If so, falsification is even further away than will be argued in the text.
Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis
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associated just with conscious choice. Second, to the eye of a philosopher of action,
Libet-type experiments are very crude. For instance, no distinction is made between
decisions and desires or urges, even though much philosophical theory deems such a
distinction highly relevant. Third, it might be that conscious decision-making is
more likely to play an independent causal role in choices between morally non-
equivalent actions, such as in cases of resisting temptation. It is questionable
whether Libet-type results should be extrapolated to these other cases without
further evidence. Meanwhile, methodological objections include whether partici-
pants’ introspective timing reports are reliable, and whether the readiness potential
is indeed the neural signature of action initiation (footnote 7). All such objections, if
accepted, would render free will’s falsification by neuroscience experiments more
difficult and so would help this paper’s thesis. But even just the first reason from
earlier, namely that the causation is only probabilistic, will prove sufficient for our
purposes. Again, the overall strategy is to show that Testable fails even under the
most friendly assumptions.
So far, then, the evidence is not enough to falsify free will.8 But what really
matters for our purposes, and what so far appears to have been largely neglected in
the literature, is the more fundamental question: what evidence would do so?
The natural answer is: perfect neuroprediction. That is, if we could predict
physical actions with 100% accuracy before subjects reported consciously deciding
on them, then, assuming the subjects’ reports are accurate, free will would be
falsified. All incompatibilist positions accept that free will cannot exist if human
action is fully determined by prior physical causes. The best possible falsifying
evidence would therefore be perfect prediction, which in practice means perfect
neuroprediction.9 If it were achieved, it would close the probabilistic escape hatch
above, for if an action were already 100% determined then there would no longer be
any room for free will to intervene—or at least, there would be evidence that no
such intervention ever actually takes place.
Determinism would falsify incompatibilist free will, but we do not know whether
determinism is true. The point here is that perfect neuroprediction would be the
necessary evidence to demonstrate it, or rather, to demonstrate that free will is
having no effect. Perfect neuroprediction is the relevant criterion for us because it is
the way to demonstrate the impotence of free will empirically by means of
neuroscience, rather than by appeal to extra-empirical metaphysics.
Some would dispute that even perfect neuroprediction is sufficient. For instance,
imagine a Kantian utopia in which all agents acted strictly according to duty. Then
8 Various other types of empirical evidence have been claimed to threaten free will too, such as some
results from social psychology or the symptoms of some clinical mental disorders. But these too are
unconvincing falsifiers—see, e.g. O’Connor (2009, 179–180) for discussion.
9 Perhaps a breakthrough in the metaphysical interpretation of quantum theory would generate a
consensus that the universe as a whole is deterministic, thereby rendering incompatibilist free will
empirically falsified without any need for neuroscience at all. But: first, this currently seems an unlikely
deus ex machina. Second, it would not adjudicate between compatibilism and incompatibilism, thus still
leave open which of those is correct, and thus still leave open whether we have free will. And third, at
least one incompatibilist, namely O’Connor (2000, chapter 6), denies that it would falsify free will
anyway, on the grounds that a deterministic quantum mechanics at the micro-level still would not rule out
emergent—and possibly indeterministic—causal powers at higher levels.
R. Northcott
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their actions would be perfectly predictable and yet nevertheless freely chosen. The
underlying point is that it matters on what basis a successful prediction is made. If it
is on the basis of the right kind of reason, then that need not falsify free will. Here is
a different caveat: Mele (2013) argues that if there were only a short time lag
between the unconscious signal and the conscious awareness of intent, this could
still be consistent with the agent having freely willed their decision yet only
becoming consciously aware of having done so part way through the process.
Genuine falsification must conclusively demonstrate that conscious deliberation is
impotent in decision making, and perfect neuroprediction is not enough for this.
What would be required in addition would be either more detailed knowledge of the
exact causal sequences in the brain (see also Mele 2009, 156–158), or else a much
longer time lag between signal and conscious awareness.
Again, if these objections were accepted, they would help the paper’s thesis by
making falsification more difficult. However, once again I will assume the most
favorable case for Testable, namely that perfect neuroprediction is indeed sufficient
for falsification. Testable will not survive even then.
These objections to sufficiency do suggest a different danger though. In
particular, are existing incompatibilist theories of free will committed to Testable at
all? If not, then arguments against Testable are arguments against a straw man, at
least in the case of philosophers. There are relatively few explicit discussions of this
issue in the incompatibilist literature, whose focus has typically been on other
matters.10 Nevertheless, upon examination I think it is clear that at least some of the
leading incompatibilist theories are indeed committed to Testable, or so I will argue
now. In particular, they are committed to accepting that perfect neuroprediction (or
at least some cases of it) would falsify free will. Moreover, to my knowledge few
philosophers have explicitly denied that empirical evidence could bear on whether
free will exists, i.e. few have explicitly denied Testable. Thus, a rejection of
Testable would indeed break fresh dialectical ground.
Now consider various incompatibilist positions in more detail. Start with
Nozick’s (1981) event-causal account. According to it, roughly speaking, freely
willed actions are those caused by reasons of the right sort. If perfect neuropre-
diction were possible based purely on factors that theory deemed reasons of the
wrong sort, or not reasons at all, that would suggest that the right kind of reasons are
causally inefficacious, which in turn by Nozick’s own lights would imply a
falsification. Libet-style readiness potentials, for instance, would seem clearly to be
an example of the wrong kind of factor; thus, perfect neuroprediction on the basis of
them would indeed falsify free will. Similar remarks apply to other event-causal
accounts, such as (Kane 1996). They apply to the range of non-causal ownership
accounts as well (e.g. Ginet 1990; Pink 2004). These too must assume that a
person’s choice is not wholly determined by prior factors, or at least not by some
kinds of prior factors, which in practice means that they could not accommodate
perfect neuroprediction, and certainly not if the neuroprediction were on the basis of
10 Mele is one exception (2009, 157–158). Roughly speaking, he argues that falsification would follow
from any demonstration that our psychological decision-making system is deterministic. I think, in turn,
that the best evidence for this system being deterministic would be perfect prediction at the appropriate
level. Thus, I take this to endorse our criterion of perfect neuroprediction.
Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis
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something like Libet’s readiness potentials. And Ginet, for one, implicitly endorses
Testable when he criticizes O’Connor’s theory precisely because, Ginet charges, it
is not empirically testable (1997, 96).
What of agent-causation views (e.g. Chisholm 1976; O’Connor 2000; Clarke
2003)? Would perfect neuroprediction falsify these theories too? If not, then I would
classify them as being committed to the existence of free will a priori, and thus not
to be committed to Testable in the first place. What discussion there is of this in the
literature has, not surprisingly, focused on the case of an indeterministic world. In
particular, imagine that the results of agents’ free choices just so happen exactly to
replicate the frequencies of those actions that would have been generated anyway by
purely physical laws. This seems conceivable, and so in an indeterministic world
there is no contradiction between the exercise of free will and the observation that
all events are consistent with scientific law. O’Connor concedes that this renders
free will empirically untestable (1995, 195): ‘‘it seems that it is impossible in
principle, for us ever to know whether any events are produced in the manner that
the agency theory postulates, because such an event would be indistinguishable
from one which was essentially random.’’11 So does Clarke (1993, 99): ‘‘there is no
observational evidence that could tell us whether our world is an indeterministic
world with agent causation or an indeterministic world without it.’’12 But Pereboom
disagrees (2003, chapter 3). He argues that such a coincidence is statistically
implausible and therefore that the lack of any observed law-violations is already
strong empirical evidence against free will. In effect, he claims that agent-causalist
free will is empirically testable, and moreover has been tested and has come out
badly. The logic behind this claim is intricate though. It turns on whether we have
any well-founded beliefs regarding what probability distribution we should expect
to describe the outcomes of freely willed actions. I will not discuss that here. The
relevant point for us is that agent-causalists are unpersuaded, and not clearly
irrationally so. Dialectically, the empirical evidence that Pereboom cites has
therefore not been decisive because it is unable to transcend the two sides’ differing
background assumptions. As we will see, such a situation is the very definition of
untestability.
So, it is arguable that agent-causal theories should indeed be read as rejecting
Testable. On the other hand, the general doubt that perfect neuroprediction would
cast on indeterminism suggests that it might nevertheless constitute evidence against
even agent-causal free will. But either way, other incompatibilist theories of free
will clearly can be reasonably construed as committed to Testable, so overall
Testable is not a straw man.
11 On the other hand, elsewhere O’Connor seems in effect to urge the opposite attitude, i.e. to endorse
Testable: ‘‘It is an open empirical question… whether and when the basic capacity to choose, to which
philosophers give most of their attention, is present and regularly exercised in a way necessary for true
freedom of choice’’ (2009, 185, my italics).
12 This line of argument could also be used against the verification condition for free will suggested in
Sect. 2. The thought is that even if an absence of fully determining physical causes of volitional actions
were established, nevertheless those actions could still be ascribed to chance. If so, that would render free
will unverifiable as well as unfalsifiable.
R. Northcott
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Finally, turn to an entirely different issue, nothing to do with straw man worries:
never mind whether perfect neuroprediction is sufficient for falsification; is it even
necessary? The motivation to ask comes from the famous objection, going back at
least to Hume, that mere physical indeterminism does not in itself ensure room for
free will. Indeed, by making physical events beyond the full control of any agent,
indeterminism arguably even tells against it. So why should lack of perfect
neuroprediction, and the implication that we cannot rule out neural events being
indeterministic, be deemed an escape route for free will? The answer is that the
issue at hand is epistemic. Suppose that in fact there is no free will. How could we
demonstrate that? Answer: by perfect neuroprediction. But lacking that, we cannot
rule out that any imperfection of prediction is due to the operation of free will rather
than to mere physical indeterminism. Therefore, epistemically speaking, in order to
rule out free will, perfect neuroprediction is indeed necessary.13
4 Why Free Will is Not Falsifiable
I conclude that perfect neuroprediction is in practice the only route by which free
will might be empirically falsified. It is clearly necessary for that and, in this section,
I will assume that it is also sufficient, thereby again for the sake of argument
considering only the case most favorable for Testable. The crucial question then is:
will perfect neuroprediction ever be feasible? I answer ‘probably not’, and thus that
free will’s falsification will probably never be feasible either. There are two
powerful reasons why not.
First, successful models of complex systems are usually probabilistic, and this
feature is persistent. In particular, this (so far) well describes neuroscience. In
Roskies’ words (2006, 420): ‘‘The picture that neuroscience has yielded so far is one
of mechanisms infused with indeterministic or stochastic processes. Whether or not
a neuron will fire, what pattern of action potentials it generates, or how many
synaptic vesicles are released, have all been characterized as stochastic phenomena
in our current best models.’’ The timing of electrical ‘spikes’ emitted by cortical
neurons, for instance, has long been apparently stochastic. Usual practice has
therefore been to create higher-level constructs such as ‘average firing rate’ in order
to ensure successful modeling. Moreover, probabilistic principles are increasingly
being incorporated into models of many decision-making (and other) cognitive
processes (Chater and Oaksford 2008). Data in psychology too ‘‘almost invariably
show probabilistic rather than deterministic causation’’ (Baumeister 2008, 67).
Models of monkey decision-making, in some ways more advanced than those of
humans because greater instrument penetration of monkey brains is possible, also
remain universally probabilistic (Roskies 2014). Overall, there is no induction in the
13 Suppose no one ever has any understanding of why they are doing what they are doing—as suggested,
for instance, by Gazzaniga (2011). As an anonymous referee points out, this claim would, if accepted,
falsify free will without perfect neuroprediction being necessary, and regardless of whether determinism
is true. But for it to establish Testable, Gazzaniga’s claim would need (as per Sect. 5) to be accepted by
all sides, and I do not think that prospect is likely—for instance, non-naturalistic defenders of free will
certainly haven’t accepted his claim so far.
Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis
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science towards more deterministic models; quite the contrary. Accordingly, there is
no induction towards perfect neuroprediction.
Moreover, some recent findings suggest that ‘‘the brain seems to incorporate
deliberately an element of randomness into its decision-making processes. The
neural mechanisms that generate choices during resource acquisition, for example,
seem to reflect an added ‘bonus’ for probabilistic exploration of new environments
and new alternatives…Our world, including human cognition, is shot through and
through with probabilism’’ (Newsome 2014). The explanation is that decision-
making is in this way made more efficient: ‘‘the occasional random choices perform
the same creative function as occasional random mutations in the genome—they
allow exploration of a much larger space of possibilities than would be encountered
by simple deterministic processes’’ (Newsome 2014—see there for further
references). That is, there is positive reason to think that at the neurological level
the processes themselves—not just our models of them—are indeterministic. In
which case, perfect neuroprediction will never be achievable.
Second, many complex systems are chaotic. In the manner of the butterfly effect,
in such systems deterministic predictions require indefinitely fine-grained knowl-
edge of initial conditions. In practice, this means that perfect prediction is
infeasible; probabilistic modeling is forced upon us permanently. At the moment, no
one knows whether the relevant brain systems are actually chaotic in this way. But
to assume that they are not would amount to no more than an act of faith,
unsupported by any trend in the science.14
To be sure, these considerations do not yet prove that we will never be able to
falsify free will empirically. However, they do show two things: first, that it is not
falsifiable now, nor will it likely be in the near future. And second, that there is no
particular reason for optimism that it will become falsifiable as science advances.
Rather, it seems likely that it will not.
Two further points: first, if free will is defined to obtain only if the decisions that
cause actions are conscious, then free will could be falsified by showing that
consciousness plays no role in action generation. Again, perfect neuroprediction
would be necessary for that, this time prediction of decisions by exclusively non-
conscious (as opposed to pre-conscious) neurological processes, assuming that they
could be identified. But for similar reasons to those just discussed, it seems dubious
that such perfect prediction could ever be achieved by humans.
Second, would demonstrating the impossibility of perfect neuroprediction be
tantamount to demonstrating the absence of fully determining causes? If so, the very
reason for free will’s unfalsifiability would imply also its verification. But the
arguments against the possibility of perfect neuroprediction applied only to our
neurological modeling of the brain, not to the brain itself. In order to falsify free
will, we need to show that physical causes in the brain completely determine action,
and the only way we can do that is if our neurological models predict perfectly. On
the verification side, we need to show that there are no fully determining physical
causes. But the fact that our best models are stochastic is not in itself enough to
14 Neither this nor the previous reason implies that the universe itself is indeterministic. The
indeterminism is purely with respect to our best models.
R. Northcott
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establish this metaphysical claim. This is because that would require the further
inference that the causes left unmodeled cannot be physical—and this inference
needs independent justification. In other words, in order to show deterministic
causation, perfect prediction by models is sufficient. But in order to show lack of
deterministic causation, imperfect prediction by models is not sufficient—because
now we need to say something also about unmodeled causes too. None of this rules
out the possibility of verification a priori: as per Sect. 2, there exist methods in
science for establishing the required absence of full determination by physical
causes. But it does underscore one reason why verification of free will is so difficult.
5 What is Testability?
So far, we have been making do with a somewhat intuitive understanding of
testability, but we should now examine this notion more closely. Among other
things, doing so will clarify the way in which any claim of untestability is inevitably
relativized to background assumptions. It will also thereby clarify how this paper’s
particular claim of untestability bears on tests that, even though falling short of
outright verification or falsification, are still evidentially relevant to some degree.
Duhem and Quine famously taught that no claim is testable on its own but rather
only in conjunction with various auxiliary (i.e. background) assumptions (Duhem
1954; Quine 1951, 1955). Furthermore, according to Quine, testability is always a
matter of degree: any hypothesis, no matter how deeply entrenched within a belief
system, might conceivably be jettisoned in the face of some observation or other.
Others have disputed this (Laudan 1990); I return to the issue below. In any case, in
practice the epistemic statuses of a hypothesis and of associated auxiliary
assumptions are often highly asymmetric. As a result, a verification (or falsification)
will redound to their credit (or blame) correspondingly asymmetrically. It is this
asymmetry that saves a claim about testability from triviality: ‘everything is
testable’ yes, but ‘everything is equally easily testable’ no. In terms of Quine’s own
holistic metaphor, a hypothesis and auxiliary assumption may differ in how close
each is to the periphery of our web of belief and thus may differ in their
susceptibility to empirical revision.
What matters for our purposes is whether an empirical test can adjudicate a
dispute between competing hypotheses. The question of testability becomes the
question of whether a dispute is empirically decidable.15 If both sides agree on
relevant auxiliary assumptions, an empirical test may indeed be decisive. If not, it
may not be. As Duhem himself emphasized, there can be no single ‘crucial
experiment’ in isolation; rather, an experiment can only ever be crucial given
suitable agreement about auxiliary assumptions.
15 Indeed, arguably empirical testing is always a comparative matter, being between a proposition and an
alternative. Because this alternative may not always be the proposition’s simple negation, strictly
speaking testability is therefore a property of a problem, i.e. of a proposition plus contrast, rather than of a
proposition singly (Sober 1999). In our case though, the competing propositions are indeed ‘we have free
will’ and its negation, so we may elide this technicality without loss, as in the paper’s title. The points
developed in the text, about testability’s relativization to auxiliary assumptions, are unaffected.
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It is a truism of under-determination that many different sets of beliefs are
consistent with the same set of observations. Logically speaking, it is thus
contingent which particular sets of beliefs participants actually do hold. The take-
home message is that testability is inevitably relativized to the particular sets of
beliefs that competing sides happen to have. There is no absolute fact of the matter
about whether any particular dispute is testable; rather, it will be testable given some
participant background beliefs but untestable given others.
With this philosophy of science groundwork in place, return to the case of free
will. What is the relevant difference between the two sides’ background
assumptions? It does not concern what would constitute either verification or
falsification: the analysis in the previous sections is not at issue. Rather, the
difference shows in the response to the fact of empirical undecidability, i.e. to the
fact of neither verification nor falsification being achieved. In effect, each side puts
the burden of proof on the other. Thus, if there is no proof either way, believers take
that to leave belief in free will undamaged, while skeptics take it to leave disbelief
in it undamaged.
Generally, to resolve disputes in science it is necessary that relevant auxiliary
assumptions are themselves independently testable (Sober 1999). But in the case of
the free will debate, this is just what is not possible—hence the empirical
intractability. This is because the relevant auxiliary assumptions are themselves
rooted in deeply held philosophical commitments, such as sympathy to naturalism
or its opposite, or the epistemic primacy to be given—or not—to third-person
empirical evidence. And such disagreements are of course not simply decidable
empirically. So we are stuck.
In summary, given the background beliefs of the competing research programs,
current evidence cannot cause either side to revise their foreground belief about free
will.16 Accordingly, the free will dispute is not empirically decidable.
I want to emphasize that this relativization to the two sides’ background beliefs
does not render free will’s untestability therefore somehow mitigated compared to
other cases of untestability—because all untestability claims are so relativized.
Turn at last to the issue of degree. Imagine, for instance, that scientists achieved
99% accurate neuroprediction. Although therefore short of perfection, might this be
enough to shake even advocates’ faith in free will, and moreover, crucially, might it
be significantly more feasible to achieve than 100% predictive perfection?
Similarly, might even some imperfect level of brain mapping, and thus of proof
of absence, be enough to cause skeptics to change their minds, and again, crucially,
be more feasible to achieve? In which case, the argument runs, the mere infeasibility
of absolute verification or falsification is not yet enough to establish the untestability
thesis.
In reply: free will’s in-principle testability is already implied by the in-principle
revisability of all beliefs. So what matters in practice is whether evidence
sufficiently strong to sway beliefs will become actually available. And the record
suggests not. For example, even 80 or 90% predictive accuracy would clearly have
16 In Bayesian terms, each side’s degree of belief in whether free will exists will not be altered
significantly.
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minimal dialectical effect. It is not clear exactly what level would make a big
difference, but at a minimum likely something close to the aforementioned 99%.17
Yet, for the reasons discussed in Sect. 4, achieving even that or anything close
seems fanciful. Rather, the general picture is that, by the time a piece of evidence
has become feasible to obtain, it has lost its ability to change core beliefs; and by the
time a piece of evidence would be strong enough to change core beliefs, it has
become infeasible to obtain. Given different auxiliary assumptions it might have
been different, but given the ones the two sides actually have we are stuck. Evidence
sufficiently strong to sway beliefs is not available, and moreover there seems little
prospect of it becoming so.
To sum up: it is not that the existence of free will is ‘in principle’ forever
empirically untestable—but then arguably nothing is ever untestable in this absolute
sense. Rather, free will is untestable in the sense that matters: given the auxiliary
assumptions that the two sides are actually committed to, decisive evidence is
unobtainable.
6 Compatibilism
So far, we have only considered free will as understood by incompatibilists. What
about compatibilists? All agree that whether we have a case of compatibilist free
will is frequently empirically testable—it is often easy to observe, for instance,
whether an agent is making a decision under coercion.18 Many popular defenses of
free will against alleged or prospective neuroscientific falsification have in effect
defined free will in compatibilist terms (e.g. Nahmias 2015). That is indeed an
effective defense. However, for our purposes it is also unsatisfactory in that it begs
the question against incompatibilism.
Overall, assessing the testability of free will is a twofold procedure: first, is
compatibilism or incompatibilism correct? Second, if compatibilism is correct then
free will is testable; but if not then it is not. But what of the first stage—is the
compatibilism–incompatibilism dispute empirically decidable? Surely not, given
the range and depth of substantive philosophical commitments that would determine
the implications of any empirical findings. If so, then the overall untestability thesis
remains intact. Neither the truth of incompatibilist free will, nor the prior
compatibilism–incompatibilism dispute, is decidable empirically.
17 The degree of belief in free will is not related linearly to the accuracy of prediction. Thus, 60%
accuracy clearly does not imply 0.6 degree of belief in (lack of) free will, and neither need 99% accuracy
imply 0.99 degree of belief.
18 Two nuances: First, if compatibilists are viewed as being committed to the causal efficacy of conscious
decision-making, then perhaps empirical investigation could threaten even compatibilist free will—
although that would merely confirm that it is testable. Second, I am ignoring science fiction scenarios,
such as aliens secretly manipulating our every action so that what we ordinarily think are uncoerced
decisions are in fact anything but. Even then, the untestability of compatibilist free will would further
require that this alien conspiracy could never be discovered by us. But in any case, ultimately, as the text
explains, the paper’s overall thesis stands or falls regardless of whether compatibilist free will is
testable or not.
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7 Conclusion
Free will is not empirically verifiable because we cannot feasibly rule out that
otherwise unexplained actions are due merely to so far undiscovered (non-agential)
physical causes. And it is not empirically falsifiable because the perfect
neuroprediction needed for that is infeasible.
There are many other issues surrounding free will that, by contrast, certainly are
susceptible to empirical enlightenment and that are being actively investigated:
What is the role of conscious intention in human decision-making? What influences
our attributions of free will, and of moral responsibility? What role did attributions
of, and subjective experience of, free will play in our evolutionary past? What role
do they play now in our social and ethical discourse and theorizing? Perhaps
skeptics of free will may also find in the science raw material for filling out
deflationary or error theories. Nevertheless, regarding the central metaphysical
question—does free will exist?—empirical testing cannot help us. Or at least it
cannot help us now or in the near future, and perhaps ever.
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